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The ethical implications of intervening in bodyweight
Stacy M Carter,1,2 Ian Kerridge,1 Lucie Rychetnik1,2 and Lesley King3
This chapter is about the ethical implications of health sector actions intended to change 
individuals’ or communities’ weight. We consider these implications using two hypothetical 
cases. The first is Megan, a 15-year-old girl whose BMI is in the range defined as obese. She 
has been unable to lose weight and her parents are considering seeking clinical help. The 
second case is the population of the state where Megan lives, in which 35% of adults and 
15% of children are reportedly overweight, and 17% of adults and 5% of children obese. The 
minister for health, prompted by these statistics, is determined to take action. What ethical 
issues are relevant for Megan, her parents, and the health professionals they may consult? 
What ethical issues are relevant for the citizens of the state, their minister for health and 
their bureaucrats? How does a focus on the care of individuals impact on public health, 
and how might community-level interventions affect people like Megan? Interventions 
designed to treat and prevent obesity in individuals and in communities raise important 
ethical issues. These issues are both distinct and overlapping; because the interventions 
have different goals, risks and benefits, moral compromise is always necessary. The central 
task is to think through the ethical and philosophical issues before action is taken: whether 
in clinical medicine or in public health. We present ethical approaches that can assist in 
such reasoning.
In this chapter we examine the ethical implications of intervening in weight, and the ethical 
difference between intervening in the weight of individuals and the weight of populations. 
We discuss these issues via two cases: Megan, a hypothetical 15-year-old girl, and Australia, 
the country where Megan lives. We conclude that there are distinct and overlapping ethical 
concerns at individual and population levels, and that at both levels moral compromise 
is necessary. Both clinicians and public health professionals need to consider the ethical 
issues and implications before action is taken. Using our two cases, this chapter provides 
examples of such reasoning. 
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Megan
Megan is 15 and a high-school student. She is technically ‘overweight’: 165 cm tall and 76 
kg, with a body mass index of 27.9 kg/m2. Megan has always been larger than many of her 
peers. As a young child Megan wasn’t aware of her weight, but began to be self-conscious 
in primary school after being teased by a fellow student for being fat. Since then she has 
become increasingly fearful of bullying. Megan has two close friends, but other students 
often tease her during breaks at school. In physical education classes she is often overlooked 
in team selections and teased by fellow pupils. 
Megan’s parents became worried about her weight when she was six. They enrolled Megan 
in several team sports over the years, but she begged to be allowed to discontinue each 
one: she felt uncoordinated and awkward and was resented by teammates, who saw her 
as a liability. When she was ten, her parents began putting her on diets. In the last four 
years she has tried a meal replacement product, Weight Watchers, a grapefruit diet and 
the Atkins diet: each time Megan lost weight but regained it. Friends, family members, 
teachers, or even complete strangers frequently comment about Megan’s weight. When 
this happens, she thinks: ‘Don’t they realise? I already know I’m fat and I’m trying to fix 
it!’ Megan’s parents worry about her future; they hear constant media reports about health 
risks, depression and other problems associated with higher weights. 
Someone suggests Dr Jim Spright – a general practitioner experienced in managing 
overweight in adolescence – as a good starting point to ‘do something’ about Megan’s 
weight, and Megan’s parents decide to seek his professional advice.
The population in which Megan lives
Megan lives in a metropolitan city in Australia, where approximately 21% of adults are 
considered obese and 35% overweight, and 25% of children aged five to 17 overweight 
or obese [1]. The hypothetical health minister, prompted by these statistics, public health 
officials and academics, decides that she wants a formal overweight and obesity strategy. An 
Obesity Summit is convened to discuss policy options. Academics, public servants, public 
health officials, commercial weight-loss service providers, exercise industry representatives, 
food industry manufacturing and retail representatives, surgeons, endocrinologists and 
general practitioners – including Dr Spright – are all invited. 
Over the course of the summit, participants discuss many options. How should food be 
labelled and marketed? Should marketing for some foods be banned? Should healthy 
behaviours be mandated? Should health department money be spent on projects with 
departments of public transport and urban planning? Should spending be focused on kids 
or on adults? What should be done in schools? Should bariatric surgery be publicly funded, 
how and for whom? How should social marketing be used, and what can it achieve? Their 
goal is to produce feasible, acceptable recommendations for actions that will reduce the 
population prevalence of overweight and obesity significantly by 2020. 
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Individuals and populations as a focus for action
A distinction between intervening in the lives of individuals – like Megan – and intervening 
in populations – like Australia – is fundamental to public health practice. An iconic 
statement of this was made by Geoffrey Rose in his 1985 paper ‘Sick individuals and sick 
populations’ [2]. Rose noted that within our population, we tend to treat average states as 
‘normal’, and deviation from such states as ‘abnormal’ [2]. We present to doctors as patients 
because we perceive ourselves to be ‘abnormal.’ The goal of clinicians is to determine whether 
we are ‘abnormal’, and if so, explain why. Rose argued that this is an investigation of why 
variation occurs within a population [2]; in the case of weight, for example, a doctor tries to 
determine why a patient is fatter than the rest of the population. This is done through direct 
clinical interaction – a relatively intimate and proximal exchange. The clinician’s problem-
solving is based on examination of the patient and listening to the patient’s story, and can 
take into account many aspects of their lives. The clinician attempts to determine causes 
for that individual, and achieve the best outcome for them. This might require advocacy for 
that person against systems designed to ration services. 
Rose argued that this important clinical process provides only partial understanding of 
health problems. If a causal factor is distributed evenly throughout a population, everyone 
in that population is equally exposed to it. Thus a clinician is unlikely to ‘see’ it as a causal 
factor for a patient like Megan, because, within the doctor’s population of patients, it 
does not explain why some patients are thin and others fat. The only way we can ‘see’ the 
effect of such an omnipresent factor is to compare a whole population that is heavier on 
average – say Australia – with one that is leaner on average – say Japan [3]. To make such 
a comparison changes the key question from ‘Why do some Australian individuals weigh 
more than their peers?’ to ‘Why is overweight more common in Australia and less common 
in Japan?’ These two explanations, Rose argued, may rest on different causal factors [2]. 
This led Rose to distinguish between two kinds of intervention: the ‘high-risk’ strategy, in 
which individual cases in the high-risk ‘tail’ of a distribution were identified and treated, 
and the ‘population strategy’ where root causes were identified and altered to potentially 
shift the entire distribution slightly towards lower risk [2]. Although Rose noted strengths 
and weaknesses of each, he proposed that the ‘population strategy’ could lead to a greater 
average improvement in health because of its radical intervention in root causes for whole 
populations. 
Clinicians must act in the best interests of a patient, within a health system inevitably 
constrained by resource limitations. In contrast, population health interventions focus on 
whole populations, and public health policy-makers on allocating resources to maximise 
efficiency; this means such policy-makers may need to be less sensitive to the complexities 
of individuals’ lives, and more conscious of equity and opportunity cost across whole 
populations. In the clinical case, the patient presents to the clinician and asks for treatment. 
In the case of public health, the population is unlikely to have asked to have its ‘incidence’ 
reduced, making the rights and responsibilities of all involved less clear.
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Clinical ethics and public health ethics 
Ethics is the study of what should be done: a prescriptive, systematic analysis of what 
is required for human wellbeing [4]. The descriptions above reveal the potential for 
incompatibility between the ethics of clinical medicine and the ethics of public health. 
They occur in a different milieu, take different objects, seek different objectives, and work 
from different information. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the development of clinical 
ethics has been reasonably distinct from the development of public health ethics. 
Ethics has been a concern of the medical profession for over two millennia: in this sense, 
medical ethics is not new. However the focus on ethical analysis and reform of clinical 
medicine and biotechnology has intensified since the development of bioethics in the 1960s 
[5]. Clinical ethics grew and developed during the second half of the 20th century but 
during this period public health ethics was relatively neglected [6–8]. Systematic attempts 
to establish an ethic for public health began in earnest in the 21st century producing, for 
example, a specialist journal [9], full-length books [10] and technical reports [11, 12].
Approaches to clinical ethics 
A number of moral frameworks have been proposed to guide clinical decision-making, 
including casuistry (case-based reasoning), narrative ethics and the ethics of care [4]. The 
most dominant framework, however, has been principle-based ethics (sometimes referred 
to as ‘principlism’ [12]. Much-criticised, much-revised and extremely influential, it focuses 
on four central and two derived principles for ethical conduct (hence the name): respect 
for the autonomy of the patient, beneficence (doing good for the patient), non-maleficence 
(not doing harm to the patient), ensuring justice, veracity (practicing honestly) and respect 
for the patient’s privacy and confidentiality. While each of these principles is important, 
they are, in themselves, not action-guiding and must always be specified and balanced 
and supported by rules that describe their scope, authority and relevant processes. Respect 
for autonomy, therefore, requires that a patient’s consent is sought before commencing 
treatment, but does not demand that a patient’s decisions always be respected, irrespective 
of the cost. Likewise, rules for consent must be clearly articulated to outline who can 
consent, what capacities are required before one can consent, and what should be done 
where a person is unable, because of illness, to consent. While this approach is deceptively 
simple, and may obscure considered ethical critique, the fact that it provides a moral 
framework that appears consistent with clinical practice has led to its widespread adoption 
by the health professions. 
Approaches to public health ethics
In contrast to clinical ethics, there is little consensus on the best approach to ethics in public 
health, except for a general agreement that public health ethics requires its own framework 
[7, 13]. To date the literature has suggested five key issues in evaluating public health 
actions: benefits and harms of intervention (or non-intervention), problem definition and 
telos (ultimate purpose), fairness and distributive justice, process and procedural justice, 
and rights [5, 11, 14–20]. 
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Maximising benefit, minimising harm
The framework most commonly associated with public health is utilitarianism, a 
consequentialist and welfarist philosophical position that emphasises achieving the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people. Utilitarians are firstly concerned with the 
effectiveness or benefit of an intervention [5, 14, 17, 19, 21] and the balance of any benefits 
to the attendant burdens [5, 14]. Possible concerns here include coercion, infringement, 
intrusion or undermining of human rights (see below) [11, 14, 16, 17] whether the response 
is proportional to the problem [14], whether the action is necessary [14, 19], and the cost 
of the intervention, including the opportunity cost [17, 19]. It is also important here to 
consider the quality of evidence on matters of ethical concern [15, 19, 20]. 
Problem definition and telos
Some writers emphasise the severity of the problem or risk addressed [17] and the goals 
of intervention as key issues for ethical evaluation. More ethical interventions are thought 
to relate to severe problems, fundamental causes, conditions and environments, and/or to 
address the ill-health that people impose on each other rather than the ill-health people 
impose upon themselves, because this is more respectful of the autonomy of individuals 
[5, 15]. 
Increasing fairness or distributive justice
Other writers have argued that social justice, community, common good and/or recognition 
of mutual vulnerability are the best basis for public health ethics [6, 22, 23]. These writers 
suggest that it is most important to evaluate the fairness of goals and interventions, and 
the distribution of benefits and burdens, especially with regard to vulnerable groups and 
health inequalities [5, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21]. For these writers, goods in public health may 
be more valuable if they can be obtained only, or more efficiently, through collective action 
or if benefits pertain to whole communities [5, 14, 17, 19, 21], such as through provision of 
supportive environments or assisting communities to act [11, 16].
Process and procedural justice
Another approach is less concerned with principles, values or justifications, and more with 
processes and procedural justice. This approach values collaboration and participation 
[14, 15], transparency and accountability (including informing or disclosing, speaking 
truthfully, and providing public justification) [14–16, 19, 20] acknowledging and 
accommodating diversity, applying fair process when consensus cannot be reached [14, 
15], obtaining consent, determining community acceptance or ensuring adequate mandate 
for intervention [11, 15, 19], and building and maintaining trust [14, 15].
Rights as a basis for public health
The final domain argues – broadly – that human rights provide the most coherent, 
egalitarian, universalisable and critical framework for public health [7, 17]. These rights 
generally include protection of privacy and confidentiality [15] and respecting the ‘right to 
health’ enshrined in some international agreements, which entails a ‘positive right’ to health 
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improvement [7, 17, 24]. Limiting an individual’s freedoms is justified only to prevent harm 
to others, that is, respecting their ‘negative right’ to non-interference – sometimes called 
the Millian harm principle, after John Stuart Mill [7, 16, 21, 24]. 
A central problem for all approaches to public health ethics
Consideration of each of these domains is necessary for a comprehensive account of any 
public health intervention. All approaches, arguably, can inform decisions regarding a key 
problem in public health ethics: the degree to which coercion – forcing someone to act 
against their own will – or paternalism – interfering with someone’s liberty or autonomy 
without their consent to make them better off – are ethically permissible in public health 
[25, 26]. This is a central issue because degrees of coercion and paternalism have been 
key to the successes of public health [7, 11, 21] – think of seatbelt laws, gun control, 
fluoridation, sanitation and food hygiene regulations. A central challenge for public health 
is thus to define exactly when paternalism and/or coercion are permissible, and under what 
conditions, and what responsibilities this may entail for governments and individuals [18]. 
Some public health actions are justified by qualifying the paternalism involved. Three 
justificatory qualifications are made. The first is that the paternalism is ‘soft’ – that is, that 
it restricts only ill-informed and involuntarily actions. The second is that the paternalism 
is ‘weak’ – that is, that it interferes only when a person’s actions are inconsistent with their 
own goals. The final justification is that the paternalism is ‘welfare oriented’ – that is, that 
those intervening are concerned only for a person’s physical and psychological condition, as 
opposed to preventing them from being ‘morally corrupted’ [11, 18, 21]. These distinctions 
are a matter of degree and need to be argued on a case-by-case basis. 
Some, particularly those concerned with rights and with procedural justice, argue that a 
simplistic opposition – paternalism or coercion versus freedom – obscures the complex 
relationship between these concepts, and de-emphasises the positive freedoms that public 
health interventions can promote [21]. Although voluntarism is not always effective [6], 
freedoms can decrease the need for coercion. If states engage communities, earning trust 
that negative freedoms will be respected, individuals may be more likely to seek help; 
conversely coercive interventions may be less effective or drive epidemics underground [7, 
14, 17]. In addition, even strongly paternalistic actions could be moderated by democratic 
oversight or a community-level mandate [27]. These scholars would argue that by engaging 
communities paternalism can be lessened and better justified. 
We have now considered both clinical and public health ethics. In clinical ethics, a clinician 
engages directly with a patient and the problem she presents. The clinician attempts to act 
in the patient’s best interests and to advocate on her behalf. The clinician seeks to determine 
what has made that individual patient atypical – ‘high risk’ – in the distribution of her peers. 
More ethical clinical conduct, broadly speaking, will be that which respects the patients’ 
autonomy, does her good, does not harm her, treats her justly and honestly, and respects 
her privacy and confidentiality. In public health, the situation is different. A decision-
maker engages with ‘problems’ that are most likely to be defined statistically by the state, 
and may not be priorities for the community. The public health professional – if applying 
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a ‘population’ strategy – will seek to determine what makes this population different from 
other populations in regard to that problem, and to intervene in these ‘root causes’, ideally 
in a way that maximises benefit, minimises harm, seeks justice, is procedurally transparent, 
minimises violation of the rights of individuals, and can justify any coercion or paternalism 
entailed. 
What ethical issues are relevant for Megan, her parents and Dr Spright?
Megan and her parents attend Dr Spright’s office for a long appointment. Spright’s 
training, as Rose would say [2], is to find the ‘causes of Megan’s case’, that is to find a causal 
explanation for why Megan, as an individual, deviates from the average or desired weight 
for her age. During the appointment he asks many questions about Megan – about her 
development, diet, exercise, other illnesses, symptoms, schooling, friends and family. 
He takes measurements and samples. He discusses the evidence for, and his experience 
with, a variety of approaches and services – dietary regimes, weight-loss clubs, specialist 
physicians and centres and exercise programs. 
Dr Spright – Jim – has done continuing education courses in clinical ethics. He is keenly 
aware that his interactions with Megan and her mother are ethically charged, and that 
bioethical principles are expressed daily through the actions of doctors like him. Jim tries 
to conduct himself ethically, as he would with any other patient. In the interests of non-
maleficence, he recommends actively against some programs and services that he thinks 
are non-evidence based and exploitive. His beneficence is expressed through offering 
evidence-based options that he thinks will help. He tries to respect the autonomy of both 
Megan and her parents in their conversation. Jim knows that Megan has her own opinions 
and goals and tries to draw her out whenever he can. He tries to inform but not over-
inform, pulling back when they seem to be overwhelmed. He offers his own opinion – with 
clear reasons – when Megan and her mother ask for it. He is careful not to act in ways 
that could undermine Megan’s self-esteem, and he gently asks questions about the role 
of her family in her daily habits, not assuming that she is completely independent in her 
choices [28]. Apart from being sensitive to whether or not Megan’s family can afford private 
services, and whether they are insured, Jim doesn’t consider the cost of different treatments 
when making his recommendations – he considers only whether or not he thinks they are 
best for Megan. 
In this sense, Megan is like any one of Jim’s patients. However Megan is also unlike many 
of Jim’s patients. Megan is apparently well. If she suffers from any current condition, it is 
the psychological effects of the stigma commonly experienced by fat people [29]. Jim is not 
being asked to treat a current, urgent medical condition like a broken finger or an acute 
infection. Instead he is being asked to ‘treat’ two problems: a future risk (that Megan will 
experience future weight-related health problems), and a socially produced psychological 
condition (the product of her stigmatisation). Jim does not think about Megan in this way, 
however. Because of his expertise and training, because he has read many reports showing 
that obesity is potentially damaging for health, and because Megan and her mother are 
asking him for assistance he defines Megan’s weight as ‘a problem’. He sets about explaining 
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why she is fatter than other 15-year-olds, and seeks to provide an individually tailored 
solution in the most ethical way possible. This individualism is a natural product of case 
analysis, attention to ethical principles and clinical problem-solving. It is, however, very 
different from what happens at the Obesity Summit. 
What ethical issues are relevant for Australian citizens, their minister for health and their 
bureaucrats? 
The week after Jim sees Megan, he attends the Obesity Summit. Before he goes he reads some 
of the preparatory material, but it doesn’t seem clear to him which strategies are evidence 
based and which are not. A lot of evidence is presented for the prevalence of overweight 
and obesity, but not much about the effectiveness or implementation of programs. Megan 
is on his mind as he travels to the meeting in Canberra. What good will this do her, he 
wonders? In fact, what difference will this make for anyone? 
There are several hundred people at the summit. Jim notices that not many of the 
participants seem to be obese themselves. After the Welcome to Country ceremony the 
health minister is introduced. She stands amid the applause, walks to the microphone and 
begins her opening speech.
We face a crisis in this country. Two-thirds of Australian men are overweight. Half of 
Australian women are overweight. A quarter of our children are overweight. Many of us are 
dying of the diseases that are complications of obesity, such as diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease. 
The question is what we do about it. Answering that question is what we are here for. 
Australians are simply eating more kilojoules than they are burning. Everyday foods that 
have become part of our daily diet are laden with kilojoules. Most ordinary snacks – ice-
creams, chocolate bars, soft drinks – would require an hour of fast walking to burn off. We 
are adding these snacks to our diets and simultaneously doing less and less exercise. 
Somehow, we have to find a way to eat less and move around more. We need to lose some 
weight. I don’t think the answer is banning things. We don’t want to shut down industries, or 
gag their right to advertise. We don’t want to tell people that they can’t have treats, that they 
can’t celebrate with their families. We need to find ways to make people feel responsible for 
their own actions. We need to encourage industries to self-regulate. We need to encourage 
people to make better choices. We need to give people better information. 
Your job is to work out how best we can do that. It’s the most important health challenge 
facing this country today. I will look forward to receiving the recommendations from the 
meeting. Thank you for agreeing to be a part of it.
Over the next few days, health bureaucrats, consumer advocates, representatives of 
industry, and experts from public health, epidemiology, nutrition, health economics, 
exercise physiology, health education and law rise to the minister’s challenge – presenting 
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sometimes conflicting data regarding the costs to the community, and to individuals, of the 
‘obesity epidemic’ and calling for support for a range of interventions to meet it. 
The summit concludes with a resolution calling upon the federal and state governments to 
prioritise two strategies: 1) a large, persuasive social marketing campaign aimed at raising 
awareness of the problem and motivating individuals to do something about their diet 
and sedentary behaviours; and 2) greater funding for obesity-related medical consultations 
and for bariatric surgery, including for adolescents. These recommendations are broadly 
acceptable to most political interests at the summit. They give something to both public 
health professionals and clinicians. They locate the problem and its solution with individual 
citizens; they permit egalitarian rhetoric via statistics showing equal ‘reach’ and ‘access’; 
they appear to be minimally restrictive on people’s freedoms; and they provide new income 
streams for some interests while not limiting the income streams of commercial interests. 
And, perhaps most persuasively, they are framed as being ‘evidence based’ – although in 
reality they are no more or less evidence based than other possibilities considered at the 
summit. 
In many ways the Obesity Summit is a success. It stimulates passing media interest in 
obesity, it brings together a range of disciplinary and sectional interests into open dialogue 
about obesity, and it generates clear recommendations for action. But closer examination of 
the summit reveals many of the assumptions that underpin policy-making around obesity, 
the limitations of this model of analysis and decision-making, and the potential value of a 
framework for explicit consideration of issues of ethics and evidence in public health.
The minister’s opening speech is familiar to anyone who has been audience to such 
occasions. It begins – as such speeches often do – by conflating overweight and obesity, 
associating overweight or obesity with death, and suggesting a need for weight loss, or at 
least behaviour change. Although the rhetorical power of this is clear, the evidence suggests 
that it is somewhat misleading. Many systematic reviews distinguish between the health 
effects of obesity versus overweight (showing overweight to be significantly less risky or 
even, at some ages, and in some situations, protective) and there are contradictory findings 
about the benefits of weight loss [eg 30–34]. The speech also frames individual actions 
as the key problem to be solved, and implicitly advocates a purpose for intervention: 
encouraging individuals to change their actions. Indeed, the minister explicitly guards the 
audience against restriction of trade and commerce, makes no mention of environmental 
contributors to obesity and (implicitly) restricts the critique of government. It is easy to 
argue that this fails to address the fundamental root causes, conditions and environments 
that might stimulate such behaviours, ignores the ill-health that people impose on each 
other, and in fact focuses on preventing people from harming themselves. 
The speech also emphasises that obesity is harmful and suggests that public health action 
will be beneficial. Throughout the summit, experts present competing accounts of the 
benefits and harms of various interventions, and many of the small group discussions 
focus on these evaluations. Such evaluative practices are fundamental in both public health 
planning and utilitarianism. Inasmuch as there is a positive right to health improvement, 
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or responsibility for public health practitioners to improve health, then advocacy for action 
– including advocacy of its benefits – is reasonable and required. Yet while there is much 
optimistic talk of benefits, there is often very little focus on potential harms. Jim might well 
think about Megan – an overweight but not obese adolescent coping with teasing, anxiety 
and reduced self-esteem – and wonder how some of the interventions proposed at the 
summit might affect her. Interventions such as the withdrawn Singaporean school-based 
program Trim and Fit have been empirically associated with negative outcomes such as 
bullying and eating disorders for young people [35], often while producing the desired 
reductions in weight. This demonstrates the importance of going beyond ‘effectiveness’ – 
for example, measures of desired behaviour change – by employing ethical reasoning. It 
also suggests the need for better measurement of potential harms, including stigmatisation 
[20]. 
Public health decisions should rely on evaluations of harm and benefit [5, 11, 14, 16, 17, 
19]. But the utilitarian ideal of balancing all relevant benefits and harms based on evidence 
is unlikely to be achieved [36]. Evidence is consumed in the context of political, social, 
media and lobbying pressures. Our hypothetical Obesity Summit is a conglomeration 
of interest groups jostling for prime position, and threatening harms such as job losses, 
restrictions on commercial freedom of speech, or damage to economic productivity. Little 
wonder then that public health professionals, with the best intentions, feel a responsibility 
to provide the most compelling evidence they can about the health benefits of interventions! 
Even the purest utilitarian decision-making requires weighing up of non-equivalent, and 
perhaps non-comparable, benefits and harms. Simple utilitarianism can also be limited 
by inattention to egalitarian ideals. Fairness is rarely measured [23] or addressed in 
mainstream public health strategies [eg 37], despite its rhetorical prominence in public 
health documents [38]. Although recent commentaries have asserted Rose’s deep concern 
for egalitarianism [39], the idea of shifting an entire population towards slightly lower risk 
is sometimes used to justify prioritising utilitarian average benefit over greater fairness in 
distribution of benefit. This is a values-based rather than an empirically based commitment 
[6, 22, 23]. Regarding weight, empirical evidence suggests that – for example – higher 
weight is associated with lower educational achievement [40], that the poorest Australian 
neighbourhoods have 2.5 times as many fast-food outlets as the richest neighbourhoods 
[41], and that the objective weight and subjective perception of the acceptability of weight 
in adolescents varies according to their socioeconomic status [42]. Thus, fair distribution 
may be at least as ethically important as average benefit. 
And what of rights, freedoms, coercion and paternalism? Although many scholars interested 
in these areas have focused on pandemic contagious disease [16, 43], the issues are also 
critical in chronic states such as overweight, for which the threat of harm is less immediate 
and less certain. Tobacco and alcohol provide examples of risk factors for which an argument 
can perhaps be made that behaviour constitutes a threat to others (environmental tobacco 
smoke and violence, respectively). At the Obesity Summit, economists attempt to provide 
arguments about such other-regarding harms, including costs to the taxpayer, caring 
burdens on families and work absenteeism. But while each of these issues seem relevant, for 
the most part they fail to gain traction in discussions regarding how the government should 
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intervene in response to obesity, in part, because these are; a) non-health costs; b) based on 
highly abstracted models; and c) vulnerable to the way in which overweight versus obese 
individuals are classified. Any empirical uncertainties regarding differential risks between 
these groups become highly ethically relevant to these debates, raising questions about the 
basis for justification of intervention. 
One group of scholars has answered this question with procedural justice. If, they argue, 
decision-makers make themselves accountable to communities, or can demonstrate a 
community mandate for action, they are justified in acting. Models for such mandates 
can range from the most broad (eg democratic election of a government) to the most 
specific (eg deliberative processes that actively inform and engage a representative 
sample of citizens and seek consensus on a course of action for a specific problem such 
as overweight). Summits – like our hypothetical one – can help to meet the more limited 
requirements of transparency in decision-making. However, they also raise questions about 
the circumstances under which mandate can be said to have been achieved. If summits are 
populated entirely by ‘experts’ – even if that includes ‘expert’ consumer advocates – can 
they be said to provide a real mandate? Who should legitimately make decisions about 
public health priorities? [44] Is it realistic to expect ordinary citizens to engage in public 
health decision-making? Could such engagement be achieved under the right conditions? 
These questions are yet to be answered; they bring us to the relationship between individual 
and community-level intervention. 
Individual and community-level intervention: thinking across boundaries
Jim Spright feels strangely unsatisfied with the whole process. It felt to him like a ‘political 
exercise’, and he is not convinced by the outcome. He thinks about what these strategies 
might do for Megan, and for Australia. The campaign may increase the stigma that 
Megan experiences at school. Greater funding for surgery and consultations may increase 
healthcare costs, expectations of services and distribution of services across the population. 
Spright is conservative with referrals for surgery, as he’s concerned about potential, as yet 
unknown, future harms of the procedure. He’s also concerned that the increased healthcare 
costs may have only a marginal impact on the weight or health of the population. In fact, 
he muses, the campaign might inspire Megan to assent to more radical interventions, like 
surgery, whether or not that is in her best interests. He also thinks about his poorer patients, 
because he knows that they are less likely to respond to this campaign, and have less access 
to surgery. And he wonders whether these strategies might prove to be of most benefit to 
those who are already receptive to health messages, who already think about their health, 
and who already have reasonable access to healthcare.
Jim then thinks about how health fits into the lives of his patients. He has been reading 
lately about ‘healthism’ [45], the accusation that public health prioritises health outcomes 
over other outcomes regardless of the goals of the individuals and populations they serve. 
People clearly value their ‘health’, he thinks, but what does this mean? ‘Health’ and ‘public 
health’ can be defined very narrowly or very broadly [44, 46, 47]. Jim can see that these 
strategies serve narrow definitions of health as physical health, but he wonders whether 
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they are good for people’s health more broadly: for their wellbeing. In his consultations 
with a patient like Megan, he can carefully explore life goals, values, what her weight means 
and how this relates to her emotional wellbeing, fulfilment and happiness. This is difficult, 
and time consuming, but it can be done. However Jim knows that weight is not simply an 
individual matter [48]. If we’re going to intervene in weight in communities, how can we 
think about the relationship between community and individual goals and freedoms? 
We suggest that the best way of thinking about the ethics of intervening in individuals’ 
weight and communities’ or populations’ weight is to think about both at once, and to 
consider the relationship between them. This is surprisingly rare, perhaps because few 
individuals work across the clinical–population health boundary. However, as is clear from 
the summit recommendations to support both an extensive social marketing campaign 
and the medical and surgical management of obesity, it is readily apparent that individuals 
and communities mutually interact. 
This suggests that it is a mistake to understand issues like obesity, and the public health 
responses to them, as simply a contest between respect for individual liberty (or autonomy) 
and our responsibilities as citizens, and that there is merit in exploring some of the various 
‘third way’ positions between individualism and collectivism that have been suggested in 
public health ethics [6, 7, 14, 17, 21, 27, 36, 49–52]. This work suggests several answers 
for Jim’s concerns that might help public health strategies to be more ethically justifiable. 
Respect for individual autonomy is, largely, a concern with freedom – with the freedom to 
be and to do as one wishes. However, as relational approaches to autonomy have shown us, 
these freedoms are not a purely individual matter: they are constituted in relationships. The 
communities that we belong to produce goods: things that we value. It been proposed that 
these goods are of two kinds: aggregative and corporate [52]. Aggregative goods are simply 
the aggregation of individual goods. Corporate goods, however, are an ‘emergent social 
property’ of communities: they can only be obtained through community collaboration 
or cooperation [52]. Corporate goods of public health interventions might include, for 
example, the creation of conditions that support sustainable future improvements in health, 
the development of new shared and valued cultural practices, or community attributes 
like solidarity or diversity. Corporate goods have a future orientation – rather than simply 
providing a present benefit, they provide a benefit available to future communities. This 
distinction resonates with Munthe’s call for public health interventions that both 1) 
promote population health, and 2) promote ‘equal (and real) opportunities for everyone 
to be more healthy’ [50]. For Munthe, this required providing the freedom to be healthy 
or unhealthy (including by preventing others from constraining our health opportunities), 
but the means only to be healthy [50]. 
To take such a ‘third way’ position on intervention in weight would assist decision-making 
for both individual and population-level interventions. It provides an ethical rationale that 
resonates with Rose’s concern for intervention in ‘root causes’. Changing the price structure 
and composition of the food sold in supermarkets, providing usable public transport, or 
designing a local community to provide healthier food outlets and better opportunities 
for walking would be recognisable interventions in root causes – of health, not just of 
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weight. Critically, they are also corporate goods – the kind that can only be achieved 
through collective effort and which provide sustainable future benefit. They provide 
opportunities for health and prevent others – like food producers – from constraining 
our health opportunities; however they do not constrain individuals’ freedoms to live 
unhealthily if that is what they desire. Mulvaney-Day has shown, on the basis of social 
network analyses, that the people one cares about – that is, one’s affective network – may be 
a more important influence on weight than the people who live nearby [53]. They suggest 
that ethical interventions engage at a meso-level – the level of community – leveraging 
existing relationship networks to change the opportunities available to people. This may, 
at least in part, explain the popularity of programs such as School Kitchen Gardens [54] 
which provide opportunities for existing affective networks to make changes together. Such 
programs also potentially provide both opportunities and corporate goods by changing 
the norms and practices in a social group, allowing those to be handed down through 
generations. 
The solutions chosen by the summit provide none of these collective community-level 
goods. Instead, the summit used a collective process to support individualistic solutions, 
with little evidence of engagement with the important ethical issues raised for clinical or 
public health practice. This does not, of course, suggest that participants were ignorant of, 
or insensitive to, many of the ethical issues that underpin medicine and public health, but 
rather, that these issues were not explicitly addressed, that the limitations of ‘evidence’ were 
not made clear, that the complex relationships between individuals and the communities 
in which they live were not fully exposed and that the socio-moral goals of healthcare were 
not made explicit. These are important failings, because the values, focus, scope and goals of 
clinical medicine and public health are both distinct and overlapping; because interventions 
to address problems affecting individuals and communities may have different goals, risks 
and benefits, and because moral compromise in the design and delivery of healthcare is 
always necessary. For both clinicians and public health decision-makers, the central task 
is to think through the ethical and philosophical basis for actions before they are taken. 
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